Is the NEM broken? Policy discontinuity and the 2017-2020 investment megacycle by Simshauser, P. & Gilmore, J.
                                                               






Cambridge Working Papers in Economics: 2048 
 
IS THE NEM BROKEN? POLICY DISCONTINUITY AND THE 2017-








28 May 2020 
 
 
The recent history of Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM) from 2012-2017 has been 
problematic with sudden coal plant closures, a tight domestic gas market and sharply rising electricity 
prices. The supply-side response that followed from 2017-2020 was an investment megacycle – 
12000MW of plant commitments comprising $20+ billion across 105 projects – most of them 
Variable Renewables. Problems emerged including entry lags, connection delays, system Frequency 
careering outside normal bands, failing system strength, rising Frequency Control Ancillary Service 
costs and increasing Operator interventions in the security-constrained dispatch process. Market 
institutions were caught out. Yet instead of identifying and addressing urgent problems, a suite of 
market redesign proposals emerged which focus on future investment and Resource Adequacy. In 
this article, we analyse recent NEM performance and find all pressing issues relate to realtime power 
system security, not Resource Adequacy, and reflect a Rate of Change problem stemming from record 
levels of simultaneous (asynchronous) new entry. Resolution requires establishment of ‘missing 
markets’ to restore power system resilience. Fundamental market redesign is a distraction – it may 
well become necessary but there is no united agreement as to why this is the case nor when it is 
required. As it stands, no reform proposal comes even close to resolving the NEM’s existing, and 
pressing, problems. 
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 
 






Is the NEM broken?  Policy discontinuity and 
the 2017-2020 investment megacycle 
 
EPRG Working Paper      2014 
Cambridge Working Paper in Economics      2048 
 
Paul Simshauser and Joel Gilmore 
 
Abstract  The recent history of Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM) 
from 2012-2017 has been problematic with sudden coal plant closures, a tight domestic gas 
market and sharply rising electricity prices.  The supply-side response that followed from 
2017-2020 was an investment megacycle –  12000MW of plant commitments comprising 
$20+ billion across 105 projects – most of them Variable Renewables.  Problems emerged 
including entry lags, connection delays, system Frequency careering outside normal bands, 
failing system strength, rising Frequency Control Ancillary Service costs and increasing 
Operator interventions in the security-constrained dispatch process. Market institutions were 
caught out.  Yet instead of identifying and addressing urgent problems, a suite of market 
redesign proposals emerged which focus on future investment and Resource Adequacy. In 
this article, we analyse recent NEM performance and find all pressing issues relate to real-
time power system security, not Resource Adequacy, and reflect a Rate of Change problem 
stemming from record levels of simultaneous (asynchronous) new entry.  Resolution requires 
establishment of ‘missing markets’ to restore power system resilience.  Fundamental market 
redesign is a distraction – it may well become necessary but there is no united agreement as 
to why this is the case nor when it is required.  As it stands, no reform proposal comes even 
close to resolving the NEM’s existing, and pressing, problems. 
 
Keywords  Renewables, energy markets, investment cycles 
 
JEL Classification D24, G31, L94 
 
Contact p.simshauser@griffith.edu.au 
Publication May 2020 
 Page 1 
Is the NEM broken?  Policy discontinuity  
and the 2017-2020 investment megacycle 
 
Paul Simshauser and Joel Gilmore♣ 
May 2020 
Abstract 
The recent history of Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM) from 2012-
2017 has been problematic with sudden coal plant closures, a tight domestic 
gas market and sharply rising electricity prices.  The supply-side response 
that followed from 2017-2020 was an investment megacycle –  12000MW of 
plant commitments comprising $20+ billion across 105 projects – most of 
them Variable Renewables.  Problems emerged including entry lags, 
connection delays, system Frequency careering outside normal bands, failing 
system strength, rising Frequency Control Ancillary Service costs and 
increasing Operator interventions in the security-constrained dispatch 
process. Market institutions were caught out.  Yet instead of identifying and 
addressing urgent problems, a suite of market redesign proposals emerged 
which focus on future investment and Resource Adequacy. In this article, we 
analyse recent NEM performance and find all pressing issues relate to real-
time power system security, not Resource Adequacy, and reflect a Rate of 
Change problem stemming from record levels of simultaneous 
(asynchronous) new entry.  Resolution requires establishment of ‘missing 
markets’ to restore power system resilience.  Fundamental market redesign is 
a distraction – it may well become necessary but there is no united 
agreement as to why this is the case nor when it is required.  As it stands, no 
reform proposal comes even close to resolving the NEM’s existing, and 
pressing, problems. 
 
Keywords:  Renewables, energy markets, investment cycles  
 
JEL Codes: D24, G31, L94. 
 
1. Introduction 
For most of its 23-year history, Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM) has 
been a marvel of microeconomic reform.  Prices fell to efficient levels, oversupply 
gradually cleared, the Reliability Standard of ‘no more than 0.002% Lost Load’ was 
met with very few exceptions and risks of erroneous investments were allocated to 
investors rather than captive franchise consumers. 
 
The NEM’s recent history, specifically 2016/17-2019/20, has been problematic with 
sharply rising prices, a Variable Renewable Energy (VRE) investment bubble and 
failing power system resilience.  Three key elements preceded the 2017-2020 period.  
To summarise briefly, contracting demand from 2010-2015 and overinvestment in the 
plant stock in prior periods led to material excess capacity and a procession of coal 
plant exits.  Second, the natural gas market went into an export-driven deficit from 
2014-2017 following the development of 3 x LNG export terminals when realistically, 
only two should have proceeded.  Third, Australia’s 20% by 2020 Renewable 
Portfolio Standard was the subject of policy discontinuity during 2011-2015, and VRE 
investment flows were ‘punctured’ leaving a shortened investment window to meet 
the Target.   
 
Combined, these established near perfect conditions for an awkward investment 
megacycle.  Crystallising the start of the problem-phase was a black system event in 
the NEM’s South Australian region in September 2016, as its market share of 
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renewables approached 50%.  Details of these events and the sharp rise in 
wholesale electricity prices that followed have been examined in detail in Simshauser 
(2019a, 2019b) and so we do not propose to repeat the analysis here.  Our interest is 
in the investment megacycle that followed.   
 
A large supply-side response to sharply rising prices is evidence of a market at work.  
But the volume of activity comprising the investment megacycle became a problem of 
itself, and it is not until this activity is analysed that this becomes clear.  The scale of 
investment was material enough to register on the Reserve Bank of Australia’s radar, 
becoming visible in national economic data (de Atholia, Flannigan and Lai, 2020).  As 
a highly capital-intensive, resource-based and geographically dispersed economy, it 
is not immediately obvious that this was a good thing – the last time electricity 
investments registered attention in national economic data, distribution networks 
were being gold-plated (Plumb and Davis, 2010; Simshauser, 2019a). 
 
Post-entry market conditions sparked a wave of market reform proposals to 
fundamentally alter the NEM’s real-time gross pool, zonal market design including 
the so-called ‘post-2025 market design’. Yet despite the abundance of reform 
proposals there is surprisingly little evidence, and certainly no united agreement, on 
what problem actually exists.   
 
To be sure, our subsequent analysis reveals the existing NEM design must be 
altered to restore power system resilience.  Our concern is reform proposals are 
responding to symptoms and beliefs, rather than underlying problems and evidence.   
 
The purpose of this article is to analyse market performance and the 2017-2020 
investment megacycle in particular.  Placing the fallout from an investment 
megacycle into context is important – not every deviation in the pre- and post-entry 
environment warrants a policy response, let alone policymaker attention.   
 
Our analysis shows the 2017-2020 investment megacycle was significant by any 
metric.  Over the NEM’s ~23 year history (1998-2020), 206 utility-scale new entrant 
plant comprising 28,147 MW of coal, gas and renewables reached Financial Close 
with an aggregate investment value of AUD$52.6 billion1. The surprising statistic is 
how much activity occurred during 2017-2020 – virtually half of the NEM’s historical 
investment commitments, viz. 12,148 MW (43% of the total) with an aggregate value 
of $21.5 billion (41%) across 105 (51%) projects, including 63 utility-scale solar PV 
and 32 wind projects.   
 
The NEM’s post-entry environment presents as a Rate of Change problem.  
Underlying causes of the megacycle can ultimately be traced to continuous reviews 
of Australia’s Renewable Portfolio Standard of 20% by 2020.   By the time the 
industry had ‘clear air’ on a revised renewables policy (i.e. in 2015/16) only four years 
remained to meet the Target which caused Certificate prices to spike.  With spot 
electricity prices simultaneously surging for unrelated reasons the bundled (i.e. spot 
electricity + Certificate) price created gold rush conditions. The market overshot 
creating an excess entry result.  A thorough understanding of how Australia’s Paris 
Commitment is to be met should be of unquestionable interest to policymakers in 
order to avoid an encore performance in 2027-2030.   
 
The central implication of the NEM’s post-entry environment and the Rate of Change 
problem are those relating to power system Security.  We find far less evidence of 
Resource Adequacy problems which might otherwise necessitate a fundamental 
market redesign.  The practical evidence is that 105 power projects entering en-
masse caused a visible deterioration in power system Frequency, failing system 
strength and a sharp rise in Market Operator interventions to deal with new and 
 
1 Expressed in constant 2020 dollars.  AUD$1.00 = US$0.65, €0.60 and £0.54 
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emerging modes of power system failure.  Resolution does not require a market 
redesign; it requires identification and establishment of missing markets, and their 
establishment is evidently quite urgent.   
 
This article is structured as follows:  Section 2 provides a review of relevant literature.  
Section 3 introduces our modelling framework.  Section 4 examines NEM 
performance and Section 5 catalogues the fallout from the 2017-2020 investment 
megacycle.  We examine the underlying cause in Section 6. Policy implications and 
concluding remarks follow.  
 
2. Review of Literature 
There are two streams of relevant literature, (i). on energy-only markets, and (ii). on 
climate change policy discontinuity in Australia.   
 
2.1 On energy-only markets 
An extensive literature exists on whether electricity markets, and energy-only 
markets in particular, are capable of delivering an adequate plant stock and meet 
reliability constraints given the predominance of fixed and sunk costs.  Economic 
theory and power system modelling has long demonstrated organised spot markets 
can clear demand reliably and provide suitable investment signals for new capacity 
(Schweppe et al. 1988).  But theory and modelling is based on equilibrium analysis 
with unlimited market price caps, limited political and regulatory interference, and by 
deduction – largely equity capital-funded generation plant able to withstand 
elongated ‘energy market business cycles’ (Simshauser, 2010; Arango and Larsen, 
2011; Cepeda and Finon, 2011; Bublitz et al., 2019).   
 
Of central concern is missing money, a concept formally introduced by Cramton and 
Stoft (2005, 2006) describing inadequate net revenues cf. expected returns.  Peaking 
plant are thought to be particularly susceptible given manifestly random revenues in 
organised spot markets (Doorman, 2000; Besser, Farr and Tierney, 2002; Stoft, 
2002; Peluchon, 2003; Roques, Newbery and Nuttall, 2005; Hogan, 2005; 
Simshauser, 2008; Finon, 2008; Finon and Pignon, 2008; Joskow, 2008; Spees, 
Newell and Pfeifenberger, 2013; Cramton, Ockenfels and Stoft, 2013; Bajo-
Buenestado, 2017; Keppler, 2017; Milstein and Tishler, 2019).  Actions by regulatory 
authorities and Market Operators compound matters by suppressing legitimate price 
signals (Joskow, 2008; Hogan, 2013; Spees, Newell and Pfeifenberger, 2013; 
Leautier, 2016).  Furthermore, many energy markets have been unable to deliver the 
optimal mix of derivative instruments required to facilitate efficient plant entry, 
specifically, long-dated contracts sought by risk averse project banks (Joskow, 2006; 
Chao, Oren and Wilson, 2008; Meade and O’Connor, 2009; Howell, Meade and 
O’Connor, 2010; Caplan, 2012; Meyer, 2012; Nelson and Simshauser, 2013; 
Newbery, 2017, 2016; Grubb and Newbery, 2018; Bublitz et al., 2019).   
 
Collectively, these characteristics are thought to create risks for timely investment 
required to meet power system Reliability Standards (Bidwell and Henney, 2004; 
Cramton and Stoft, 2006; de Vries and Heijnen, 2008; Roques, 2008; Hirth, Ueckerdt 
and Edenhofer, 2016).  The key issue is whether plant will arrive on a timely basis, or 
in response to a crisis (Simshauser, 2018).2   
 
High levels of VRE is thought to complicate matters because of ‘side-markets’ 
subsidies (Joskow, 2013; Newbery, 2016; Simshauser, 2018b).  VRE merit order 
effects, which may be sustainable through ‘side-markets’ may therefore pose even 
greater challenges to Resource Adequacy, implying capacity markets or strategic 
 
2 Concerns over Resource Adequacy are compounded by the fact that large segments of real-time aggregate 
demand are price-inelastic and unable to react to scarcity conditions, and similarly in the short run, supply is inelastic 
because storage remains costly (Batlle and Pérez-Arriaga, 2008; Cramton and Stoft, 2008; Finon and Pignon, 2008; 
Roques, 2008; Bublitz et al., 2019).   
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reserves may become essential (Hach and Spinler, 2016; Höschle et al., 2017; 
Bublitz et al., 2019; Milstein and Tishler, 2019).   
 
Despite this, with few exceptions Australia’s energy-only gross pool has produced a 
consistent stream of investment as Fig.2 subsequently reveals.  Three variables have 
been particularly important in this regard, i). an historically tight nexus between the 
NEM’s very high Market Price Cap of $14,700/MWh and the Reliability Standard of 
no more than 0.002% lost load, ii). the existence of non-negative forward market 
premiums above spot prices, and iii). industrial organisation and vertical integrated 
investments as a means to deal with the unusually high financial hazards associated 
with ex-ante capital-intensive peaking plant commitments and ex post performance 
(Simshauser, 2010, 2020b; Simshauser, Tian and Whish-Wilson, 2015).  While 
innovation in financial markets is typically measured over decades or centuries as 
Newbery (2020) notes, ironically the NEM successfully originated ~60 long-dated 
Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) to facilitate optimal financing conditions for VRE 
entry over the 2017-2020 cycle (see Section 4.1).  So-called “super peak” and 
“inverse solar/solar firming” shaped swap contracts are also now available from a 
small but growing number of providers.      
 
Perhaps counterintuitively, real-time energy-only markets also have many attractive 
features for managing systems with high shares of VRE (Henriot et al., 2013; Riesz, 
Gilmore and MacGill, 2016). They provide very sharp price signals for performance at 
critical times including demand-side response and flexible resources if and when 
required (Galetovic, Munoz and Wolak, 2015). In contrast, capacity markets 
necessarily require arbitrary definitions of “capacity” which will become increasingly 
problematic for markets with high VRE, short-term energy storage, flexible loads and 
firm supply delivered through diversified VRE portfolios.  Indeed, capacity payments 
do not necessarily correlate well with performance, leading to a misallocation of costs 
(Olsina et al., 2014; Byers, Levin and Botterud, 2018). 
 
2.2 On climate change policy discontinuity in Australia 
Australia has been unable to establish a united energy and climate change policy 
architecture – instead industry and consumers have been forced to navigate a  
two-decades long climate policy war between Australia’s two main political parties, 
the conservative Liberal Party, and social democratic Labor Party (Byrnes et al., 
2013; Molyneaux et al., 2013; Nelson et al., 2013; Freebairn, 2014; Garnaut, 2014; 
Apergis and Lau, 2015; Nelson, 2015; Simshauser, 2018a; Simshauser and Tiernan, 
2019).  Two policy mechanisms have been the subject of discontinuity, i). Australia’s  
Renewable Portfolio Standard and ii). Emissions Trading (Jones, 2010).3   
 
Australia introduced the world’s first Renewable Portfolio Standard after passing 
legislation in 2000 (Jones, 2010; MacGill, 2010).  An obligation of ‘2% by 2010’ was 
placed on electricity retailers and mobilised by tradeable Certificates (Jones, 2009; 
Simshauser and Tiernan, 2019). The target was comfortably met four years ahead of 
schedule (Buckman and Diesendorf, 2010). 
 
With Australia’s international CO2 commitments known, and the absence of credible 
matching policy, State Governments filled the policy vacuum –  as occurred in the US 
and Canada (Jones, 2014; Schelly, 2014). From the early-2000s State Governments 
began to mandate higher Targets for their own jurisdictions as the Commonwealth’s 
Emissions Trading policy stalled (Nelson et al., 2013; Cludius, Forrest and MacGill, 
2014; Jones, 2014; Simshauser, 2018a). Work simultaneously commenced on a 
 
3 On 20 November 1997 Australian Prime Minister Howard announced that the Commonwealth would work with the 
State Governments to “set a mandatory target for electricity retailers to source an additional two per cent of their 
electricity from renewable energy sources by 2010” and “Australia also believes that an international emissions 
trading regime would help minimise costs of reducing emissions.  (see Parliament of Australia at: 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query%3DId%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2F1997-
11-20%2F0016%22 – accessed April 2020). 
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State-based National Emissions Trading Scheme (Nelson et al., 2010; Simshauser 
and Tiernan, 2019).  The 2007 Commonwealth election thus elicited two 
commitments from Australia’s political parties; the incumbent conservative 
government’s 15% Clean Energy Target and the social democratic opposition’s 
greatly expanded renewable target of ‘20% by 2020’.  A united position existed on an 
Emissions Trading Scheme (Jones, 2010; Apergis and Lau, 2015; Simshauser, 
2018a).    
 
Australia’s 2% by 2010 Renewable Portfolio Standard and associated certificate side-
market had trivial impacts on the NEM’s organised spot market, but expanding the 
scheme to 20% (without any adjustment) revealed a number of design flaws which 
Buckman and Diesendorf (2010) explain in some detail.  For our purposes, the most 
critical were initial inclusion of rooftop solar PV which overwhelmed volumes and de-
stabilised the policy, and the use of a fixed volumetric target of 44TWh rather than a 
genuine ‘percentage of demand’ Target (Jones, 2010; Byrnes et al., 2013; Forrest 
and MacGill, 2013; Bell et al., 2015; Simshauser, 2018a; Simshauser and Tiernan, 
2019).  Compounding matters, two-yearly reviews of the Renewable Portfolio 
Standard produced visible stop-start investment cycles (Fig.2). 
 
Of special importance to our analysis was the “Warburton Review” of the Renewable 
Portfolio Standard, initiated after the 2013 Commonwealth election. The new 
government initiated an unscheduled review aimed at reducing the fixed volume 
target after energy demand contracted (following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis).  
Given contracting aggregate demand, the Standard was moving closer to a 25-30% 
target cf. the 20% policy design.  Forcing VRE capacity into an increasingly 
oversupplied and unstable wholesale electricity market with Certificate costs levied 
on consumers was occurring at a time when residential electricity tariffs were rising 
sharply due to gold-plating of networks (Cludius, Forrest and MacGill, 2014; Garnaut, 
2014; Nelson, Reid and McNeill, 2015; Bell et al., 2017).  In the end, the Standard 
was scaled-back to 33TWh (Biggs, 2016) but not before VRE investment flows were 
punctured (Simshauser, 2018a, 2019b; Simshauser and Tiernan, 2019).  Figure A1 
(Appendix I) illustrates legislated changes to the Renewable Portfolio Standard. 
 
On emissions trading, formal policies had been developed and discarded in 1999-
2001, 2005-2006 and in 2007-2010 (Simshauser and Tiernan, 2019).  In late-2010 a 
minority Labor Government emerged from the 2010 Commonwealth election, revived 
an earlier policy that had been discarded only months earlier and legislated a $23/t 
fixed carbon tax from July 2012 as a precursor to an Emissions Trading Scheme 
(Garnaut, 2014; Wild, Bell and Forster, 2015).  The policy was abandoned in 2014 
following a change of government.  Three further ETS policy attempts occurred in 
2016, 2017 and 2018 but were discarded by the right of the conservative Liberal 
party.  In all, from 1999-2018 seven formal attempts at an Emissions Trading 
Scheme were initiated with no tractable policy emerging (Simshauser and Tiernan, 
2019).  
 
3. The benchmark cost of entry in the NEM 
In order to make sense of investment patterns and market performance over time, a 
suitable new entrant benchmark is required.  The PF Model, a dynamic multi-period 
post-tax discounted cash flow model, has been specifically designed for this purpose 
by solving for multiple generating technologies, business combinations and financing 
structures, simultaneously determining the unit cost, debt-sizing and post-tax equity 
returns.  First-stage outputs are similar to levelised cost estimates but with a level of 
detail well beyond conventional Levelised Cost of Electricity Models because 
corporate financing constraints and taxation variables are co-optimised.  Model logic 
is presented in Appendix II.  
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The benchmark entrant has changed over time as technology costs, exchange rates, 
fuel costs and perceptions of CO2 emissions liabilities varied.  These changes are 
examined in considerable detail in Simshauser & Gilmore (2019) and so we do not 
propose to repeat the analysis here. To summarise, Supercritical Coal plants 
dominated until 2007, Combined Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGT) formed the benchmark 
through to 2017, from which time a combination of Wind4 + Open Cycle Gas Turbines 
(OCGT) dominates while gains from exchange exist.  Table 1 provides relevant data 
for conventional plant over six relevant reference years and Table 2 provides a time 
series for Wind.   
 
Table 1:   Technology Assumptions 1998-2020  
 
Source: Simshauser & Gilmore (2019). 
 
In Table 2, we have collated live capital costs from 67 of the NEM’s 81 wind projects 
over the period 2000-2020 and matched these data with capital markets swap rates 
for 7-year money and estimated Project Finance credit spreads (for a $/kW analysis 
of wind and solar PV in real 2020$, see Fig.18).5  
 
 
4 Solar PV is excluded from this comparative analysis due to the nature of its output (i.e. being limited to daylight 
hours) and the extensive implied backup costs.  Wind on the other hand, while stochastic, operates continuously and 
is well suited to ‘backup’ by an OCGT during low-wind/high-price conditions.  A more sophisticated analysis may 
comprise a portfolio of wind, solar and other firming technologies, i.e. OCGT and battery storage.  See Simshauser & 
Gilmore (2019), Simshauser (2020a) and also footnote #6. 
5   The average credit spread for Project Financings has been 1.92% with a tenor of 6.9 years.  Early projects 
typically secured long-dated money (i.e. 10-12 year facilities) but more recent projects gravitate to 5-year money.  For 
PF spreads over time, we have priced these at 40 basis points (bps) over BBB corporate bond spreads for modelling 






















($/kW) (MW) (MW) (kJ/kWh) ($/GJ) (%) ($/MW/a) ($/MWh) (%) (%) (t/MWh)
Incumbent - 1998
  Black Coal 1,000        1,000          2                 10,000     1.10         90.0% 52,500          1.00         0.25% 7.50% 0.92         
2004 Inputs
  Black Coal 1,400        1,000          2                 9,500       0.70         90.0% 45,000          -           0.25% 7.00% 0.86         
  CCGT 1,000        400             1                 7,000       3.00         70% 8,000            4.00         0.05% 3.00% 0.40         
  OCGT 700           300             2                 11,300     3.00         10% 3,078            7.71         0.05% 1.00% 0.60         
2007 Inputs
  Black Coal 1,500        1,000          2                 9,500       2.00         90.0% 48,000          1.00         0.25% 7.00% 0.86         
  CCGT 1,250        400             1                 7,000       3.00         70% 9,000            4.00         0.05% 3.00% 0.40         
  OCGT 875           300             2                 11,300     3.50         10% 3,315            8.31         0.05% 1.00% 0.60         
2012 Inputs
  CCGT 1,275        400             1                 6,965       6.00         70% 9,500            7.00         0.05% 3.00% 0.36         
  OCGT 893           300             2                 11,300     7.00         10% 3,751            9.40         0.05% 0.00% 0.60         
2018 Inputs
  CCGT 1,500        400             1                 6,930       8.50         70% 10,000          7.00         0.05% 3.00% 0.36         
  OCGT 1,050        300             2                 11,300     10.00       10% 4,350            10.90       0.05% 1.00% 0.60         
2020 Inputs
  CCGT 1,500        400             1                 6,930       9.00         70% 10,769          7.00         0.05% 3.00% 0.36         
  OCGT aero 1,250        240             4                 10,500     10.00       10% 4,570            11.45       0.05% 1.00% 0.50         
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Table 2:   Wind New Entrant Cost Data (2000-2020, nominal dollars) 
 
Source: BNEF, Reuters, RBA, Simshauser & Gilmore (2019). 
 
PF Model results are presented in Fig.1.  Note 2012 isolates impacts of the (defunct) 
$23/t CO2 tax –  we exclude these in all subsequent analyses.  Wind results for 2018 
and 2020 comprise two components, i). underlying run-of-plant cost estimates of $58 
and $59 respectively, and headline results including “firming6” at $77 and $81 – with 
firming derived from the carrying cost of OCGT plant (in 2018 and 2020) of $12 and 
$15, respectively. 
 
 PF Model New Entrant Costs 
 
 
4. Is Australia’s NEM Broken? 
Strains on Australia’s NEM during 2016/17-2019/20 were very significant.  A black 
system event, sharply rising wholesale (and therefore consumer) prices, large 
deviations in power system Frequency, project connection lags, unexpectedly large 
variations in Marginal Loss Factors and new modes of power system failure emerged 
 
6 Supercritical Coal and CCGT are both dispatchable plant whereas Wind is intermittent making direct comparison 
problematic.  However, a Wind generator (producing energy) combined with a fast-start OCGT plant (providing 
dispatchable capacity, but only when required) provides a more meaningful comparison.  However, this combination 















($/kW) ($/MW/a) ($/MWh) (%) (bps) (%) (%) (%)
2000 1,667 31,630 2.10 6.78 140 8.18 7.43 12.0
2001 1,813 32,262 2.14 5.87 140 7.27 7.23 12.0
2002 2,143 32,907 2.19 6.00 140 7.40 7.30 12.0
2003 1,957 33,566 2.23 5.51 140 6.91 7.50 12.0
2004 1,893 34,237 2.27 5.98 140 7.38 7.50 12.0
2005 1,828 34,922 2.32 5.77 145 7.22 7.50 12.0
2006 2,569 35,620 2.37 6.12 148 7.61 7.50 12.0
2007 1,964 36,333 2.41 6.77 217 8.94 7.50 12.0
2008 2,353 37,059 2.46 6.61 427 10.88 7.50 12.0
2009 2,344 37,800 2.51 5.45 433 9.78 7.50 12.0
2010 2,708 38,556 2.56 5.72 275 8.47 7.50 12.0
2011 2,343 39,327 2.61 5.32 321 8.53 6.97 12.0
2012 2,711 40,114 2.66 3.90 382 7.71 6.31 12.0
2013 2,088 40,916 2.72 3.87 310 6.98 5.70 12.0
2014 2,325 41,735 2.77 3.61 251 6.12 5.23 12.0
2015 2,325 42,569 2.83 2.72 280 5.52 4.73 12.0
2016 2,485 43,421 2.88 2.32 291 5.23 4.50 12.0
2017 2,114 44,289 2.94 2.65 199 4.64 4.50 10.0
2018 1,930 45,175 3.00 2.65 197 4.62 4.50 10.0
2019 1,855 46,078 3.06 1.47 217 3.65 4.50 10.0
2020 2,049 47,000 3.12 0.80 236 3.16 4.50 10.0
* Project Finance Spreads (PF Spreads) are set to 40bps above the BBB-rated bond spread.
** Project Finace Debt (PF Debt) is comprised of the 7 Year Interest Rate Swap and PF Spread.
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in the post-entry environment.  One could be forgiven for concluding Australia’s NEM 
had broken.  Some argue it has. 
 
But apparent market underperformance, deviations and market frictions in the post-
entry environment need to be catalogued and diagnosed carefully to ensure policy 
proposals target underlying (and agreed) problems rather than respond to transient 
symptoms, ‘outlier’ events and second-order issues.  Fundamental policy changes or 
market redesign would involve mass disruption, create new and unanticipated 
problems, and generate sizable transaction costs which are notoriously difficult to 
quantify ex ante. Above all, experience with fundamental policy change and market 
redesign here and abroad translates to years of stalled “merchant” investment 
commitment – and may (ironically) ultimately require central intervention7.  In 
Sections 4-5 we review NEM parameters with a view to identifying market frictions 
worthy of policymaker attention. 
 
4.1 On investment in new plant 
A persistent concern with the energy-only market design is whether Resource 
Adequacy can be maintained over time.  Grubb & Newbery (2018, p.5) summarised 
the precursor to central intervention in Great Britain’s energy-only market as follows: 
 
To the unavoidable economic uncertainties— associated not only with future 
market conditions but also the likely level, timing and frequency of scarcity 
pricing—was added political uncertainty. Investment requires some confidence 
in the future political landscape and the determinants of the wholesale electricity 
price, which one could at least plausibly estimate or hedge. However, UK 
energy policy had been in turmoil for most of the post-1997 period when the 
Labour Party came to power, with arguments over the role of coal, gas, 
renewables, and especially nuclear power. There were four Energy White 
Papers from 2003–2011. The lack of any futures market combined with these 
multiple and often inestimable economic and policy uncertainties clearly 
deterred new investment in the UK’s energy-only market…  
 
While the Australian experience regarding political interventions and policy 
discontinuity have obvious parallels to Great Britain (Section 2.2), practical out-
workings have been different.  Unlike Great Britain, the NEM’s core market design 
has remained entirely stable over its 23-year history and in consequence, aggregate 
investment in generation capacity has been very significant.  To be clear, VRE 
investment flows were ‘critically punctured’ (2013/14-2015/2016) but not eliminated, 
as Fig.2 illustrates.  
 
By way of background, the NEM’s opening plant stock in 1997/98 comprised 
~33,000MW of generating capacity producing 141TWh per annum.  By 2020, the 
generation fleet had expanded to 55,000MW with 205TWh production.  New capacity 
additions of 28,147MW were committed from 1998-2020.  Fig.2 data illustrates a 
healthy relationship between investment commitment (LHS axis) and price (RHS 
axis). 
 
7 As one Reviewer noted, centrally coordinated long-term contracts for capacity and for VRE will stimulate investment 
under such conditions. 
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 Generation plant commitments 1998-2020 
2a – Capacity (MW) 
 
2b – Investment ($ Millions) 
 
Source: ESAA, Company Reports, BNEF. 
 
Most non-VRE investments have been merchant and facilitated by industrial 
organisation.  For example, vertical utilities have been responsible for ~75% of all 
gas-fired plant entry (Simshauser, 2020b).  The surprising feature of the 2017-2020 
megacycle has been the number of long-dated, ~10+ year, Power Purchase 
Agreements originated to facilitate VRE plant entry, and the number of purely 
merchant (i.e. spot exposed) entrants.  Approximately 79% of VRE projects in the 
megacycle were PPA-contracted, with the remaining 21% fully ‘Merchant’ or spot 
exposed (nb. a large number of PPA-contracted projects were also purposefully 
oversized to acquire residual spot market exposures).  Our dataset contains 60 PPAs 
with 58% written by utilities – most of these presumably in response to the 2020 
Renewable Portfolio Standard – and the remaining 42% split between Corporate 
PPAs (17%) and Government CfDs (25%). Evidently, Renewable Portfolio Standards 
are capable of driving financial market innovation and contract efficiency. 
 
It is worth noting a sizeable proportion of NEM investments in Fig.2 qualified for 
Certificates in ‘side markets’ (Simshauser, 2018b).  Prima facie this is distortionary 
vis-à-vis the energy-only market design.  But Australian side markets have merely 
priced a carbon externality (an otherwise ‘missing market’ in the NEM) by various 

































































Statutory Reviews of the 
Renewable Portfolio Standard
 Page 10 
markets are transparent, liquid and commodity-based in nature (i.e. there are no 
guaranteed prices or fixed payment streams). Consequently, Certificate side-markets 
carry considerable price and volume risk in their own right (as Fig.19 later illustrates) 
with investment error borne by power project counterparties, not captive franchise 
consumers.  Moreover, side markets will continue – VRE Certificates are ultimately a 
CO2 derivative and a form of CO2 currency – and the efficiency of markets means 
they will ultimately become fungible with Australian Carbon Units – used by utilities to 
acquit legislative requirements, and by corporates to acquit their obligations to 
institutional investors (i.e. voluntary/ESG) given the absence of formally binding 
sectoral targets in Australia.   
 
Fig.2 confirms substantial investment but says little with respect to investment timing, 
which we address in Section 4.2.  
 
4.2 On investment timing 
Like most global market designs, the NEM has provided an effective platform for 
investing in new generation, and as Fig.4-6 subsequently reveal, with high levels of 
Reliability.  Several US jurisdictions have organized Capacity Markets which, to 
generalize, arrange auctions for firm capacity or demand response three years ahead 
in order to meet administratively determined Reliability Standards and Reserve 
Margins.   
 
The NEM does not have an organized Capacity Market. But it does have organized 
and liquid (i.e. ~350% of physical) forward derivatives markets for Swaps and Caps 
(the latter being a Capacity-market equivalent).  Put another way, an administratively 
determined Capacity Reliability Mechanism seeks to maintain a certain level of 
reserves, while the NEM’s equivalent is the $14,700/MWh Market Price Cap (and the 
Retailer Reliability Obligation8) which guides investment commitments9.  The NEM’s 
forward markets are the quintessential link between physical (spot market) 
requirements, investment requirements and Resource Adequacy given the NEM’s 
Reliability Standard of not more than 0.002% Lost Load. 
 
A common concern raised by Australian policymakers and institutions is that, with 
rising levels of VRE, peaking plant may operate as little as a few hundred hours per 
year – and by deduction presume such plant cannot be economic.  For a stand-alone 
peaking plant reliant on spot markets for revenue, this is no doubt correct. But this 
overlooks historically equivalent conditions and the practical evidence, viz. $10.4 
billion (8456MW) of investment in gas-fired generation.     
 
Peaking plant are not reliant on operating hours to generate revenue.  Revenue is 
derived from the spot market, forward markets (with ~30% premiums10 ex post) and 
crucially, industrial organisation.  NEM forward markets have a relatively short tenor 
(i.e. 3 years and are most actively traded 18 months out) and consequently tends to 
guide rather than underwrite investment (to be sure, as practitioners we consider 
fundamental power system planning to be the critical determinant of investment 
commitment).  More important for peaking plant are the various forms of industrial 
organization by matching such capacity with stochastic retail loads (Simshauser, 
2020b) or stochastic generation (Simshauser, 2020a).  Firms then actively internalize 
Cap value in longer tenors within integrated portfolios, and sell residual capacity into 
forward markets. And as Figure 3 illustrates – the average value in forward markets 
over the business cycle has been ~$13/MWh, which aligns reasonably well with our 
 
8 This mechanism, when triggered, requires Retailers to accumulate firm contracts and/or physical capacity 
equivalent to their Peak Demand at 50% Probability of Exceedance. 
9 Note that all mechanisms fail if exit-driven shortfalls are not projected in advance. 
10 Historically, traded Caps delivered ex post premiums of ~30% (time averaged) over the cycle (and negative 
premiums ex post one-year-in-ten).  This is an expected outcome given the nature of the instrument, viz. an 
insurance product connected to the NEM’s very high Market Price Cap of $14,700/MWh.     
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$14.50/MWh estimate of the new entrant cost of an OCGT plant with ‘zero’ run-
hours.11   
 
 SA Traded $300 Cap Derivatives (2008-2020, constant 2020$) 
 
Source: Simshauser, 2020a. 
 
With this background, we analyse the responsiveness of the NEM’s aggregate plant 
stock in Fig.4. The LHS-axis measures VRE-adjusted Reserve Margins (%) and 
RHS-axis measures plant entry and exit (total MW).  As an aside, the NEM-wide 
(stylized12) Reserve Margin exhibits a -0.49 correlation with spot prices, as one might 
expect.  
 
 Reserve Margins, Plant Entry & Plant Exit 1998-2019 
 
Source:  ESAA, AER, AEMO, BNEF. 
 
An important insight from Fig.4 is changes to aggregate capacity from 2012-2017.  
Note NEM-wide Reserves increased sharply from 2009-2012 as new gas plant 
commitments (2007-2009 – see Fig.2a) were progressively brought into service (and 
almost simultaneously, NEM demand began to contract 2010-2015).  The sharp rise 
 
11 The point here is that ‘under Cap revenues’ are capable of making up the difference when run hours are not zero. 
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VRE Capacity (RHS) Plant Entry (RHS)
Plant Exit (RHS) NEM Reserve Margin**
NSW Reserve Margin* VIC Reserve Margin*
QLD Reserve Margin* SA* Reserve Margin*
* Reserve Margins by region do not account for interconnector capacity and thus understate actual Reserves.
** NEM-wide Reserve Margin calculated here is stylised across two dimensions i). maximum demand is a simple sum-
of-the-regions maximums rather than coincident demand, and ii) generation is aggregated without any adjustment for 
interconnector constraints.  5.5% of Solar and 8% of Wind capacity contribute to the Reserve calculation.
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in Reserve Margins led to falling spot (Fig.2) and forward (Fig.3) prices, which in turn 
triggered an exit procession (Tab.3), the effects of which are clearly visible in Fig.4.  
Ultimately Reserve Margins returned to historical levels.  The exit speed of the final 
two plants in Tab.3 was problematic – its implications discussed in some detail in 
Simshauser (2019b). 
 
Table 3:   NEM Coal Plant Exit (2012-2017) 
 
Source: Simshauser & Tiernan (2019). 
 
4.3 On reliability of supply 
The ‘NEM Reserve Margin’ in Fig.4 implies a perfect transmission system exists, 
whereas in practice interconnectors bind during peak demand events.  The State-
based Reserve Margins in Fig.4 adopt the other extreme and assume no 
interconnection (and therefore present an excessively conservative view).  
Nonetheless, this view implies Resource Adequacy constraints in 2000, 2009 and 
2017 (and tight conditions in 2019).  Of these, 2009 was material but largely driven 
by a very significant (weather-driven) increase in VIC and SA maximum demand, 
with coincident network limitations binding within VIC and in TAS (Rai et al 2020).  As 
Fig.5 illustrates, this is the only occasion where the NEM’s Reliability Standard 
(0.002% Lost Load) was breached.  
 
 NEM Lost Load vs Reliability Standard (2002/03-2019/20) 
 
Source: Reliability Panel. 
 
More recent episodes of Lost Load (2017, 2019) are a product of the speed of coal 
plant exit, and entry lags as Section 5.5 later explains.  These were unforecastable 
events – the Market Operator was not predicting a breach of the Standard in the 
three-year period leading up to coal plant exits in 2016/17 (and to be clear, nor did 






Exit   
(Year)
Enter   
(Year)








Swanbank B 500 Qld 2012 1972 40 23.6 26-Mar-10 27-Mar-12
Playford*# 240 SA 2012 1960 52 6.9 7-Oct-15 8-May-16
Collinsville 180 Qld 2013 1972 41 5.9 1-Jun-12 1-Dec-12
Munmorah~ 600 NSW 2013 1969 44 0.0 3-Jul-12 3-Jul-12
Morwell 195 Vic 2014 1958 56 1.0 29-Jul-14 30-Aug-14
Wallerawang~ 1000 NSW 2014 1978 36 0.0 1-Nov-14 1-Nov-14
Redbank 151 NSW 2015 2001 14 0.0 31-Oct-14 31-Oct-14
Anglesea 150 Vic 2016 1969 47 3.6 12-May-15 31-Aug-15
Northern# 540 SA 2016 1985 31 6.9 7-Oct-15 8-May-16
Hazelwood 1600 Vic 2017 1967 50 4.8 3-Nov-16 1-Apr-17
 Total / Average 5156 1972 42.5 5.2
* Mothballed in 2012
# Original notice 11 June 2015 with planned closure date of March 2018













Queensland New South Wales
Victoria South Australia
Tasmania Reliability Standard
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reveals).  Conversely, closer to real time Emergency Trader Provisions were 
activated in a manner consistent with the NEM design.13 Centralised capacity 
procurement would not have resulted in different outcomes (absent costly and 
erroneous ex ante over-procurement). 
 
The NEM’s investment signals therefore appear to have operated exactly as 
intended. A separate question is whether the current Reliability Standard is 
appropriate. The 0.002% Lost Load Standard was set with regard to minimising total 
costs to consumers given the marginal cost of supply and consumers’ Value of Lost 
Load14. Both the Standard and the Market Price Cap required to achieve it have been 
regularly reviewed.  The Market Price Cap has increased over time, but until recently 
no changes have been recommended by the NEMs Reliability Panel. In March 2020, 
the Energy Security Board recommended a (non-trivial) tightening to 0.0006% Lost 
Load.  This was largely driven by concerns around current sensitivities to the existing 
0.002% Standard (i.e. potential long-tail).  Shifting to 0.0006% would ordinarily 
require a radical recalibration of the Market Price Cap – from $14,700/MWh to 
c.$40,000/MWh – but in this instance a medium term out of market Reserve is to be 
procured by the Market Operator.   
 
It is notable that the overwhelming majority of supply interruptions occur at the 
distribution network level (1096 minutes) as Fig.6 notes.  And, interruptions relating 
to power generation are dominated by real-time Security events (34 minutes) rather 
than Resource Adequacy (3.4 minutes).  We shall return to Security of Supply in 
Section 5. 
 
 Sources of supply interruptions (2009-2019) 
 
 
Source: Reliability Panel. 
 
4.4 On the efficiency of wholesale prices 
Wholesale price rises from 2016/17 were acute, unexpected and adversely impacted 
a wide array of consumers.  Section 1 outlined initial triggers, viz. coal plant exit, a 
tight gas market and entry lags.  But, as Figs.7-8 illustrate, prices largely reflect 
 
13 An important feature of the NEM is the ability of the Market Operator to step-in and procure additional Resources if 
the Reliability Standard is forecast to be breached.  These emergency powers have been utilised over time, and have 
served the market well.  Under the Rules, they are triggered up to 9-12 months in advance if forecast Lost Load is 
expected to breach the Reliability Standard.  Sources of supply are typically Demand Response (closing the gap 
between the Value of Lost Load and the Market Price Cap) and out-of-market emergency generation packs (e.g. 
diesel gensets). 
14 From a power system planning perspective the overall objective function is to minimise 
 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿 𝑥 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 + ∑ 𝑐(𝑅)𝑛𝑖=1  | 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿 𝑥 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 + 𝑐(?̂?) = 0,  
where 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿 is the Value of Lost Load and where 𝑐(𝑅) is the cost generation plant, and 𝑐(?̂?) is the cost of peaking 
plant capacity.  Provided these conditions hold, it can be said there is a direct relationship between the Reliability 
Standard and the Market Price Cap.  An alternate expression where reliability criteria is based on Loss of Load 
Expectation is 𝐿𝑜𝐿𝐸 = 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐸/𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿, where CONE is the cost of new entry.  For an excellent discussion on the 
relationship between a Market Price Cap and Reliability criteria, see (Zachary, Wilson and Dent, 2019). 
Distribution - 1096 minutes
Transmission - 11.5 minutes
Security Events - 34 minutes
Reliability Events - 3.4 minutes
Reliability 
Events
 Page 14 
market fundamentals (albeit amplified by a transient market power event in early-
201715).    
 
In order to analyse the efficiency of wholesale prices, suitable comparative 
benchmarks are required.  Results from Fig.1 have been transposed to a timeseries 
and compared against annual spot prices and wind entry costs (Tab.2) in nominal 
and constant 2020 dollars (Fig.7).  Prices, while rising sharply from their 2013/14 
lows, do not reveal sustained excursions above the cost of entry.  Indeed, as Fig.2 
aptly illustrated, each excursion above benchmark was met with a sizable supply-
side response.   
 
 New entrant cost vs Spot Prices (1998-2020) 
7a - Nominal Dollars 
 
7b - Constant 2020$ 
 
Source: Simshauser & Gilmore (2019), AEMO, ABS. 
 
NEM Spot (Fig.7b) and Forward (Fig.8) prices have largely followed the pattern of 
market imbalances (Fig.4) and are mean reverting, exhibiting elongated business 
cycles typical of energy markets generally (see Pindyck, 1999; Simshauser, 2010; 
Arango and Larsen, 2011; Cepeda and Finon, 2011; Bublitz et al., 2019).  Fig.8 
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presents (baseload) forward curves from two NEM regions by way of example.  
Forward markets missed the rapid coal closures which caused the surge in spot 
prices from 2016-2018, and from 2018 the forward curves (in backwardation) 
continuously drifted sideways – the reasons for which are examined in Section 5.5 – 
but trend towards the new entrant cost. 
 
 Spot and Forward16 Price Curves 2005-2022 (constant 2020$) 
8a – NSW Spot and Forward Curves  
 
8b – SA Spot and Forward Curves 
 
Source: AEMO, SFE, ABS. 
 
Fig.7-8 confirm prices have not been maintained beyond the cost of entry but says 
little of the allocative efficiency in between peaks.  To analyse relative allocative 
efficiency, Fig.9 contrasts Quarterly Average Gas prices with Quarterly Average Spot 
Electricity prices.  Once again, we do not identify sustained variations with the 
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 Quarterly Average Gas vs Electricity Prices 
9a – Nominal Dollars 
 
9b – Constant 2020 Dollars 
 
Source: AEMO, ABS. 
 
To be sure, electricity prices over 2017-2020 are high in absolute terms relative to 
recent history but this reflects sudden coal plant closures, falling market imbalances 
and rising underlying resource costs rather than a failure of the market to efficiently 
price supplies. Furthermore, forward prices (Fig.8) have consistently trended 
downwards given new investment commitments – reinforcing our view that investors 
are making rational (and efficient) decisions. 
 
4.5 Summary 
To summarise, new investment commitments in the NEM have totalled $52.6 billion, 
with forward markets pricing capacity over the cycle and – at least based on the 
evidence – delivering capacity on a timely basis with the Reliability Standard having 
been met with few exceptions.  Prices have largely reflected underlying resource 
costs with excursions above entry benchmarks routinely met by a wall of supply-side 
investments. 
 
The Market Operator has stepped into the market 2017-2019 and used Emergency 
Trader provisions in response to near-term concerns vis-à-vis Resource Adequacy.  
















Weighted NEM Spot Price




















Weighted NEM Spot Price





 Page 17 
should be cautious pointing to this as evidence of a market design failure.  Firstly, 
use of these provisions was necessary due to the speed of unforecasted coal plant 
closures as Fig.4 and Fig.8 illustrated (and the absence of an exit policy – see 
Simshauser 2019b), entry lags (see Section 5.5) and tangential policy interventions 
(Section 7).  Furthermore, Emergency Trader provisions are a fundamental 
component of the NEM market design – if they had failed, there may then be a basis 
for claiming a market failure. 
 
The NEM’s good news ends at this point. 
 
5. The 2017-2020 Investment Megacycle: Consequences 
Recall from Fig.2 that 2017-2020 prices induced a sizeable supply-side response.  
Australian energy markets are not foreign to an excess entry result. Indeed, as 
Armstrong et al. (1994) explain it is quite common in homogeneous commodity 
markets.  What was unusual about Australia’s 2017-2020 cycle was the source and 
pattern of investment. Traditional utilities accounted for just 15% of direct VRE 
investment commitments and only 58% of underwriting efforts by way of Power 
Purchase Agreements (PPA).  The balance of investments were by Developers 
(48%) and Superannuation/Pension Funds (36%) with a surprising ~20% of VRE 
developments being “purely merchant” (spot exposed) – a product of very high spot 
prices and falling VRE entry costs as Fig.20 subsequently reveals.  
 
5.1 Project Numbers 
The data in Fig.2 did not reveal the extraordinary number of investment 
commitments.  By historic standards, 2017-2020 could only be described as a 
cyclical boom, as Fig.10 reveals.  Note in Fig.10b that the cumulative count for 
projects by 2016 was 101  with a relatively steady trajectory (see trend line) over the 
period 1998-2016.  From 2017 the number of project commitments exploded with, as 
Fig.20 subsequently reveals, supranormal profits driving excess entry. 
 
 Absolute number of utility-scale projects  
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10b – Cumulative Number of Investment Commitments 
 
 
From 1998-2016, the 5-region NEM connected an average of 5.3 power projects per 
annum.  Over the next three years, power project connections increased by 602% to 
32 projects per annum.  Ex ante, when 105 utility-scale developments reach 
irreversible investment commitment in the space of four years in a power system the 
size of the NEM, it is beyond belief that all will present as sound economic and 
engineering power projects, ex post.  Significant investment mistakes in retrospect 
can be expected in gold rush conditions.  Investment mistakes did occur, amplified by 
network connection lags, network congestion and voltage instability necessitating ex 
post remedial capital expenditure due to failing system strength.  As following 
sections reveal, the Rate of Change evidently proved too much for many NEM 
parameters.   
 
5.2 On Security of Supply 
In hindsight, the speed of entry (i.e. 105 projects in 4 years) was striking.  If there 
was one set of parameters that stands out from all others in pointing to a broken 
market in the context of trying to digest this dramatic Rate of Change, it is the 
deteriorating performance of the NEMs security of supply (viz. maintaining Frequency 
50Hz, and voltages +/-10%).  With the rapid entry of VRE projects and gradual 
reductions in the supply of Primary Frequency Response, the Market Operator is 
encountering new modes of failure, contingent events previously considered non-
credible, and failing system strength – particularly in the renewables-rich SA Region.   
 
Fig.11 contrasts the distribution of power system Frequency in 2019 with 2012.  As 
coal plant began to close (i.e. from 2012-2017), the distribution of power system 
Frequency began to deteriorate, with marked acceleration from 2016 onwards.  By 
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 Distribution of NEM Frequency (4 second data 2012 vs 2019) 
 
Source: Reliability Panel 
 
The NEMs Normal Operating Band is 50Hz +/-0.15Hz, and the Frequency Operating 
Standard specifies the power system should be maintained within this Band >99% of 
time.  Midway through 2018/19, Frequency careered outside the Standard as Fig.12 
illustrates.   
 




Yet, the deterioration in Frequency and transient breach of the Frequency Operating 
Standard merely reflected changes in system resources17.  The administratively 
determined level of demand for Frequency Regulation services had historically been 
set to ~130MW with Frequency Contingency Services typically comprising a further 
620MW under most system conditions (i.e. a total of 750MW and equivalent to an n-1 
FCAS suite).  Frequency Regulation quantities had been set in 2004 when the NEM 
had virtually no VRE.  Quantities were (finally) reviewed from 3 October 2018 
(Simshauser, 2019a) and based on Fig.12 data, it would seem not before time.  A 
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non-trivial increase in Frequency Regulation would follow, rising from 130MW to 
220MW (and at times to as much as 350MW).  
 
To be clear, no Rule or regulation prevented an earlier revision of necessary 
quantities18, and as more VRE enters we should anticipate rising FCAS quantities 
and new FCAS services to deal with new risks – by way of example, the n-1 suite will 
ultimately be surpassed by forecast uncertainty as a more probable mode of failure. 
 
5.3 On failing system strength 
Sharply rising levels of asynchronous VRE and the consequential demise of 
synchronous coal generators in the renewables-rich SA region has had adverse 
implications vis-à-vis power system strength.  As a direct consequence of this, the 
NEM has seen a continuous rise in market interventions by the Market Operator as 
Fig.13 illustrates.  In 2019 there were 158 Directions – 153 of these related to system 
strength in the SA region (i.e. AEMO ‘constraining on’ synchronous gas-fired 
generators during typically high wind / low to moderate demand conditions).  Failing 
system strength has also presented itself in Western Victoria (Nov-2018) and Far 
North Queensland (Mar-2020).19   
 
 Number of AEMO Interventions 
 
Source: Reliability Panel. 
 
The Market Operator is now being forced to intervene in the NEM on an almost daily 
basis, which some argue is evidence of NEM market failure.  This is not correct.  It is 
necessary to distinguish between electricity market design failure, and missing 
markets.  In our view, this is a clear-cut case of a missing market (i.e. unpriced 
system strength services vis-à-vis inertia and voltage stability).  Alternate market 
designs would not reduce the number of interventions – only identification, pricing 
and scheduling of the relevant services and constraints will.  In SA, the lowest cost 
solution proved to be the installation of three synchronous condensers (as regulated 
 
18 The NEMs Frequency Operating Standard does not place any specific requirement or limitation on AEMO as to 
how Frequency should be maintained within the normal band – AEMO are in effect free to select the appropriate mix 
and quantity of services to procure.  Currently, this includes Frequency Regulation and three forms of Frequency 
Contingency Services (i.e. 6 second, 60 second, 5 minute).  Apart from increasing the quantity of FCAS Regulation, 
AEMO have not chosen to augment their Services. The authors sponsored a Rule Change to add Fast Frequency 
and Operating Reserves to the FCAS suite – see Section 7. 
19 For further details, see Reliability Panel AEMC, (2020), “2019 Annual Market Performance Review”, Reliability 
Panel Publication, Sydney.  Available at https://www.aemc.gov.au/market-reviews-advice/annual-market-
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assets20) which once commissioned are expected to immediately remove the need 
for the SA Directions in Fig.13.   
 
5.4 On Frequency Control Ancillary Services (FCAS) 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, a corollary to Section 5.3-5.4 is an increase in FCAS market 
prices (i.e. spot markets for Frequency Regulation, and 6 second, 60 second and 5 
minute Frequency Contingency).  Monthly FCAS costs are highlighted in Fig.14, and 
are dominated (on a proportionate basis) by one of the smallest regions (SA – 
following the exit of the last coal plant).  To generalise, FCAS costs tend to rise in the 
peak wind production season (i.e. July-Sep) when asynchronous wind generation is 
highest and consequently, synchronous thermal generation is lowest. 
 
 NEM FCAS Costs 2010-2019 
 
Source: AEMO, BNEF. 
 
But the rise in FCAS prices also triggered a supply-side response following the initial 
(and, evidently, warranted) rapid intervention by the SA Government with their 
underwriting of the 100MW / 135MWh Tesla Battery.  Battery Storage investments 
have since streamed into the market, with aggregate capacity now approaching 
typical FCAS Regulation quantities.  Battery response times are measured in 
milliseconds, and this capability can, should, and at times is, used.  However, there is 
currently no market for FCAS Fast Frequency Response which would otherwise 
improve system ‘resilience’ to new modes of failure, including low inertia conditions – 
it is a missing market.  
 
5.5 On connection lags 
From 2018-2020, the NEM baseload forward curve was in persistent backwardation, 
but the front end of the curve seemed to continually ‘drift sideways’ as Fig.8 
illustrated.  Forward markets had assumed, erroneously, that apart from scheduled 
construction lags new entry would be frictionless and therefore prices would fall.  
That assumption proved manifestly wrong. Entry frictions beyond construction lags 
exceeded all expectations. 
 
Stock analysts at Bank of America Merrill Lynch undertook a project-by-project 
analysis of total observed development delays and showed an average ‘additional’ 
entry lag of 33 weeks (7½ months) per Tab.4.  Parallel analysis by ARENA (2020) 
and Australia’s Clean Energy Finance Corporation across 14 utility-scale solar PV 
 
20 Not all missing markets warrant the transaction costs associated with organised spot markets, while in others 
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projects found an average additional entry lag of 38 weeks (~8½ months) compared 
to original construction schedules.  Central to lags was the rapidly changing Network 
Connection process.  Furthermore, post-connection R2 validation commissioning 
testing (i.e. ensuring actual performance equates to pre-connection modelled 
performance) would constrain output levels below maximum practical output – in the 
case of the ARENA sample - for an additional 28 weeks on average.   
 
Table 4:   Observed Delays of Development Projects under construction in the NEM 
 
Source:  Bank of America Merrill Lynch21 
 
Grid connection has never been easy, and nor should it be given the consequence of 
error.  Following the 2016 black system event in SA (sparked by 4 wind farms failing 
to meet s5.3.4A Generator Performance Standards), a ‘do not harm’ clause was 
added to the Rules which required all new connecting generators to undertake a Full 
Impact Assessment with a special focus on system strength (s5.3.4B of the Rules).  
Networks and the Market Operator simply weren’t ready for Rule change 
implementation – and project proponents, Original Equipment Manufacturers and 
Project Banks were all caught out as a result.   
 
Physical system models were being refined on the fly, and under the new Rule 
multiple iterations of connection studies were being undertaken while modelling 
capacity and precision attempted to catch up with physical realities – all of which 
contributed to the results in Tab.4 and in ARENA (2020).  Networks and the Market 
 
21 See Low and Yang, (2019), “The National Electricity Market (NEM): the capacity bomb is still coming”, Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch, Australian Utilities Equity Research, 2 October 2019.  
 
Site Name Jul-17 Dec-17 Jul-18 Jan-19 Jul-19 Aug-19 
Barker Inlet Power Station           
Bomen Solar Farm         
Bulgana Green Power Hub - BESS          
Bulgana Green Power Hub - Wind Farm          
Bungala Two Solar Farm            
Cattle Hill Wind Farm          
Cherry Tree Wind Farm         
Cohuna Solar Farm         
Coopers Gap Wind Farm           
Darlington Point Solar Farm         
Dundonnell Wind Farm            
Finley Solar Farm         
Granville Harbour Wind Farm          
Haughton Solar Farm          
Kennedy Energy Park - Solar           
Kennedy Energy Park - Storage           
Kennedy Energy Park - Wind           
Kiamal Solar Farm - Stage 1         
Lal Lal Wind Energy Elaine end            
Lal Lal Wind Energy - Yendon end            
Lilyvale Solar Farm            
Limondale Solar Plant 1         
Limondale Solar Plant 2         
Lincoln Gap Wind Farm            
Maryrorough Solar Farm        
Molong Solar Farm        
Moorabool Wind Farm            
Nevertire Solar Farm         
Oakey 2 Solar Farm          
Oakey Solar Farm            
Rugby Run Solar Farm            
Stockyard Hill            
Sunraysia Solar Farm            
Tableland Mill (expansion)            
Warwick Solar Farm         
Yarranlea Solar Farm            
Yatpool Solar Farm            
    First date recorded    
     On Time      
     < 6 month delay    
      6+ month delay    
 
 Page 23 
Operator were using different models which produced different results, adding to 
confusion.   
 
In the classic case, a VIC region solar PV project could not connect until it had 
installed a Synchronous Condenser – a c.$20m capital cost incurred post-financial 
close.  Other projects connected but faced binding production caps for 6-12 month 
windows which adversely affected revenue streams and debt servicing capacity – the 
most well-known case involving five VRE projects in a rhombus-shaped area of 
remote western Victoria and remote southwestern NSW, which subsequently 
became known as ‘the Rhombus of Regret’.     
 
Unintended consequences would follow. Investment commitment and Financial 
Close had historically occurred on the strength of a ‘draft’ s5.3.4A letter of approval 
and a draft Network Connection offer (the former being a pre-condition of the latter) 
with Final documents negotiated during construction.  The prospect of incurring 
greatly increased construction costs post-Financial Close, or facing elongated 
binding production caps while Full Impact Assessment studies were resolved, meant 
Project Banks altered their conditions precedent – rather than drafts, Banks would 
now require final s5.3.4A, s5.3.4B approvals, and final Network Connection 
Agreements before Financial Close. 
 
For all new projects, a sizeable barrier to entry had just been erected.   
 
In practical terms, developed projects now needed to be held in suspended 
animation for a period of ~6 months while Connection Agreements, Generator 
Performance Standards (s5.3.4A) and Full Impact Assessments (s5.3.4B) were 
completed.  The process involves a complex four-way negotiation process between 
project proponent, Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), Network and Market 
Operator (and suite of expert advisors).  Above all, it necessarily brings forward very 
sizeable components of detailed project design work involving material non-
refundable capital expenditure prior to Financial Close – capital costs which used to 
be incurred post-Financial Close.   
 
‘Queueing’ along the Connection supply chain was a predictable outcome as limited 
resources within Networks, the Market Operator, OEMs and even within the 
independent expert engineering advisory firms reached breaking point. Indeed, in our 
discussions with one of the wind turbine OEMs, almost 75% of their internal global 
grid connection experts were working on Australian projects, despite representing 
less than 10% of their worldwide order book, due to the complexity of the NEM’s new 
connection Rules.   
 
During the roughly 6-month period of ‘project suspended animation’, project sponsors 
are exposed to changes in equipment pricing, exchange rates, the cost (and 
availability) of capital, and the PPA underwriting the entire project.  These are 
material risks, the reasons for which are axiomatic, and several instances of near-
committed projects collapsed when time-sensitive capital or PPAs were ‘pulled’.  To 
compound matters, newly established projects were being subjected to new 
constraints as AEMO’s modelling capabilities improved.  Even high value, flexible 
assets such as Batteries were caught up in Connection lags22. 
 
 
22 As practitioners, the authors were involved in a 25MW / 52MWh Battery Project and among the first to be exposed 
to a Full Impact Assessment under s5.3.4B of the Rules.  The process was initiated on 23 May 2019 and was 
completed on 7 May 2020.  Fortunately, an interim result issued late-Sep-19 allowed Battery connection from Oct-
2019.  The Network & the Market Operator couldn’t agree on what scenarios to test, used different models which 
generated different results, and,  frustratingly, the Network’s Model couldn’t initially integrate a battery.  After a series 
of adjustments, the Full Impact Assessment initially indicated that the adjacent (13-year old) wind farm presented a 
system risk and was exposed to a marginal production cap.  Six months later, Modelling results gave both the Battery 
and the Wind Farm a clean bill of health (i.e. it was evidently a modelling input  issue – no change to plant was 
required).  
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5.6 Variations in MLFs - Marginal Loss Factors 
VRE investor surveys reveal the most significant perceived risk to be shocks to 
Marginal Loss Factors (MLFs) ascribed to NEM generators (ARENA, 2020).  MLFs, 
the static estimate of each individual generator’s marginal network losses, are 
revised each year by the Market Operator.  Variations in MLFs have historically been 
modest; for example the black coal fleet MLF has averaged 0.95+/-0.02 (Fig.15).  
However, a number of recent VRE investments have been subjected to dramatic 
MLF variations. This matters because Total Revenue = [Price x Quantity x MLF].  
Fig.15 illustrates fleet-average MLF variations from 2016-2021 – the impact of the 
megacycle is most evident with the solar PV fleet-average falling from 1.0189 to 
0.9081 – a change of more than 10 percentage points.  
 




But the extent of these variations needs to be put into context.  Of the 105 
development projects committed in the cyclical boom, 2645MW or less than 30% of 
new projects were materially adversely affected by an MLF change (i.e. which we 
define as an MLF falling below 0.90).  As Table 5 notes, 64% were solar projects. 
Interestingly, the traditional market-facing energy utilities who actively trade in the 
NEM’s spot, forward and retail markets had virtually no exposure (~3%) because 
they all have an acute understanding of site-selection and MLF risk.  Conversely, the 
new breed of non-traditional NEM VRE investors – who do not have large in-house 
development and trading teams, and no history of exposure to adverse MLF 
movements, viz. Pension Funds – are disproportionately represented (59%).  The 
balance of adversely affected projects are owned by a small number of VRE 
Developers23 (38%) as Tab.5 illustrates. 
 
Table 5:   Generating Capacity Materially Adversely Impacted by MLFs in 2020/21 
 
Source: AEMO, BNEF, AEC, Company Reports. 
 
 
23 Most VRE developers faced minimal adverse effects.  In discussions with a Partner from one of the Big 4 advisory 
firms, their analysis showed that across 20 developers, only 2 were materially adversely affected (and were evidently 

















Wind Solar Total Owner
Developer -        993       993       38%
Pension 878       688       1,567    59%
Incumbent Utilities 75         11         86         3%
Total 953       1,692    2,645    
Wind/Solar 36% 64%
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While variations in MLFs have adversely impacted a number of VRE investors, this is 
a matter of producer surplus – consumer welfare is unaffected.  Some have argued 
that variations in MLFs are a form of market failure and left uncorrected, will result in 
higher hurdle rates in future and sharp curtailment in VRE investment commitments 
(and point to current downward trends).  More recently the AEMC has argued this is 
evidence of a need to shift to nodal prices.  
 
We find both lines of argument unconvincing.  The NEM comprises 55,000MW of 
generating capacity with over 400 generator connections.  Adversely affected 
projects comprise 2645MW of generating capacity at ~30 (mostly very remote) sites, 
with an overrepresentation of solar PV connecting into 33kV and 66kV networks.  
These  projects represent less than 5% of the plant stock and 30% of cyclical boom 
investment commitments.  We noted at the outset that when 105 projects are 
committed in the space of four years in a long, skinny network like the NEM, it is 
beyond belief that all will present as sound economic and engineering propositions – 
significant mistakes in retrospect will be made.   
 
Proposals to move to average loss factors emerged.  Unsurprisingly, the AEMC did 
not see fit to alter the MLF process – instead opting to maintain market stability and a 
methodology consistent with the laws of physics.  However, the Rate of Change and 
asymmetric information regarding i). a lack of transparency over rival projects and ii). 
the absence of any MLF sensitivities, undoubtedly amplified the extent of investment 
mistakes in retrospect. 
 
5.7 Security-Constrained Dispatch and Economic Curtailment 
The culmination of issues in Sections 5.1-5.6 meant certain projects would face 
dispatch constraints and in addition, economic curtailment given production 
correlation between technologies within certain geographies.  We have analysed the 
production constraints facing the NEM’s Wind fleet from 2015/16-2019/20 (Fig.16).  
Any production constraint with spot prices above $5/MWh has been classed as a 
‘Security’ constraint, whereas lost production when prices were below $5/MWh has 
been classed as ‘Economic’ curtailment.  SA and VIC regions dominate total lost 
wind production (and note an equivalent analysis of Solar PV would presumably 
reveal material constraints in QLD). 
 
 Wind Production Constraints 2015/16-2019/20 
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In the SA region, lost Wind fleet production has risen from ~1% per annum (2015/16) 
to around 7% per annum (2019/20), with Security Constraints comprising the 
dominant (~¾) share.  Over time as system strength issues are resolved, one would 
expect these to be relaxed, but economic curtailment is likely to rise and in most 
instances this will be an efficient outcome. 
 
5.8 Refinancing Task 
A summary of investment commitments undertaken over the NEM’s history and 
during the 2017-2020 megacycle is presented in Tab.6.  As a percentage of NEM 
history, the four-year cyclical boom produced 12,148MW (43%) of new installed 
capacity, $21.5 billion (39%) of committed capital across 105 projects committed, and 
51% of total NEM project connections. 
 
Table 6:   NEM Investment Commitments (1999-2020) 
 
 
2017-2020’s $21.5 billion investment commitment comprised $9.9 billion in debt 
capital with an average tenor of 6.9 years, and median tenor financing dominated by 
5-year money (by global standards, a relatively short tenor).  In addition to project 
debt facilities, there is an additional $12.9 billion in corporate facilities from traditional 
(non-regulated) merchant energy utilities.      
 
Figure 17 presents the aggregate industry refinancing task.  Evidently, Australian 
bankers will be especially busy in 2022-2023.  Between now and 2025, 84% of VRE 
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2020$ Capacity Investment Projects Capacity Investment Projects
(MW) ($ million) (No.) (MW) ($ million) (No.)
Coal 2,953        6,910.8     5              -            -            -            
Gas 8,456        10,372.4    32             480           522.0        2              
Wind 9,552        22,893.0    81             5,227        10,581.7    32             
Solar 6,479        11,045.7    70             6,151        10,138.7    63             
Other* 706           1,356.0     18             290           247.0        8              
Total 28,147      52,577.9    206           12,148      21,489.3    105           
1999-2020 2017-2020
Sources: ESAA, AEC, BNEF, Company Reports.  Excludes Return to Service of 120MW Smithfield OCGT.
*Other includes battery storage, hydro, mini-hydro, biomass and landfill gas.
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$17.9b in total.  And with a strange twist of irony, policymakers have decided to 
conduct a ‘post-2025 market design program’  and commit to the design by the end 
of 2021 – just as the refinancing task commences in anger. Any fundamental change 
is likely to be highly problematic and almost certainly create a string of liquidity 
events. 
 
 NEM Refinancing Task 2019-2030 
 
Sources: Company ASX announcements, websites & media releases, Bloomberg, RenewEconomy. 
 
6. Cause of the megacycle 
Business cycles are normal.  The NEM’s 2017-2020 cycle was not.  It was driven by 
many things going wrong, and all at once.  Uncoordinated coal plant exit, rising gas 
prices, a market power event aggravating price rises, and crucially, an undersupplied 
but rapidly closing window to meet a 20% Renewable Portfolio Standard by 2020.  
For good measure, VRE entry costs plunged from 2016 (Fig.18) which no doubt 
added to gold rush conditions and the excess entry result.   
 
 Capital Cost of NEM VRE Projects (Constant 2020$) 
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18b - Solar 
 
Source: ESAA, BNEF, ABS, Company Reports.   
 
Coal plant exit and rising gas prices had the effect of driving spot and forward 
electricity prices above benchmark entry levels (Fig.2, Fig.8).  A market power event 
in QLD amplified these conditions – in the very short run many aspects of the power 
system are inelastic – demand is unresponsive, capacity is fixed and storage is 
costly.  But in the long run supply and demand are very elastic and in response, 31 
QLD solar PV projects (49% of NEM solar project commitments) comprising 
2300MW of capacity were committed under boom conditions (and 180MW of smelter 
load exited). 
 
But in our view, the central driver of the megacycle can be traced to 20% Renewable 
Portfolio Standard policy discontinuity.  It had been the subject of continuous review 
throughout the early 2010s.  By the time the policy was finally “settled” in 2015/16, 
only four years remained to meet a sizable 20% target after years of stalled 
investment under uncertainty (recall from Fig.2 that statutory reviews had punctured 
the flow of investment).  Certificate prices surged to the penalty cap of $90/MWh 
(Fig.19) just as spot and forward electricity prices were surging to their record highs. 
 
  Renewable Portfolio Standard Certificate Prices 
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'2% by 2010' RPS 
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Rooftop PV separated 
from 20% RPS 
Abbott Govt announces 
'Warburton Review' of RPS 
(market anticipates lower Target)
2007 Election commitments: 
both parties announce 
Expanded Targets
Labor Wins Election: 
'20% by 2020' RPS
New 33TWh RPS agreed 
between Major Parties
Record Project Commitments, 
Regulator announces Target 
will be met by 2020
Market consensus: too little time 
left to meet 33TWh by 2020 -
Certificates hit the Penalty Price
Rooftop Solar PV 
overwhelms RPS
Connection Lags & 
MLFs visibly affect 
Certificate supply
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By 2017, the market was confronted with underling forward electricity prices of ~$80-
90/MWh and renewable Certificate prices of ~$80-90 – collectively totalling 
$160+/MWh (Fig.20).  At the same time, falling technology costs presented the 
market with sizable supranormal profits.  As Fig.20 indicates, from 2016-2020 gold 
rush conditions emerged.  With supranormal profits, an excess entry result 
comprising 105 projects was the unfortunate outcome.  To be sure, many projects 
beyond the 105 entrants failed to enter – project supply ‘vastly exceeded’ the 
shrinking 20% Renewable Portfolio Standard window, and so PPA prices also fell 
rapidly as Fig.20 illustrates (with many US, EU and Southeast Asian institutional 
investors holding identical investment mandates that required contracted 
revenues/PPAs as a precondition to commitment). 
 
 Bundled Prices vs Wind Entry Costs & PPA prices (2002-2020) 
20a – Nominal Dollars 
 
 
20b – Constant 2020 Dollars 
 
Sources: AEMO, GFI, BNEF, Company Reports. 
 
One of the notable underperformers in our list of 2017-2020 entrants was 
dispatchable capacity.  Of the 12147MW of new plant capacity, only 600MW24 of gas 
 
24 This includes 120MW at Smithfield, which has been excluded from most calculations as it was a mothballed Cogen 
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and 210MW of Battery Storage was commissioned – most of this in SA where it was 
desperately needed.  No plant was developed in QLD, consistent with its current 
level of structural oversupply.  In NSW, the 120MW Smithfield Gas Turbine was 
returned to service and in VIC, a 30MW battery was commissioned.  Why so little 
dispatchable capacity committed in NSW and VIC? 
 
Firstly, forwards for $300 cap contracts trended downwards to below our estimated 
$14.50/MWh for new entrant OCGT plant.  Furthermore, the System Operator was 
not projecting a breach of the NEM’s Reliability Standard (with the exception of a 
2019 ‘scenario’ which presumed delayed return to service of two plants on extended 
outages in the Vic region in 2019/20).  While Reserve Levels have fallen, this is not 
inconsistent with history (and entirely consistent with the megacycle). Therefore, a 
lack of new dispatchable capacity does not represent a market failure per se. 
 
However, this does not mean future problems will not occur. Historically, the NEM’s 
large vertical utilities have been responsible for 75% of all investments in new gas-
fired generation plant.  In 2017 the ACCC flagged an informal 20% (regional) 
generation market share threshold, and the desirability of non-integrated new entrant 
generators in NSW, VIC and SA.  In response, the Commonwealth Government, with 
no history of market intervention in the NEM’s (then) 22 year history, launched an 
‘Underwriting Scheme’ for new dispatchable generation (and at the time of writing, 
was the subject of an Auditor-General Review on the grounds of process, or lack 
thereof).  The scheme was closed to Australia’s Big 3 utilities and we suspect their 
two largest integrated rivals.  The Commonwealth also introduced their so-called ‘Big 
Stick’ legislation which threatens utilities with forced divestments along with other 
intrusive interventions.   
 
All of the NEM’s utilities have advanced gas-fired generation projects but have 
evidently (and understandably) been hesitant to commit.  Compounding matters is 
another of the NEM’s largest vertical utilities, the government-owned Snowy Hydro, 
which has semi-committed to a 2000MW pumped-storage hydro (nb noting a 
requisite $2 billion transmission line augmentation and site environmental approvals 
are unresolved) which casts a long shadow over the NSW - given the size of the 
project.  And finally, the VIC Government has cast a shadow of its own by committing 
to underwriting a very large portfolio of new VRE plant by way of government-initiated 
Contracts-for-Differences (4500MW of VRE capacity in aggregate by 2025).  Out of 
market CfD transactions make investing in merchant plant in VIC extremely 
problematic. 
 
7. Policy Implications 
From our analysis of the NEM’s 2017-2020 megacycle, what problems did we 
identify? The first point to note is that rising prices are a symptom, not a problem.  
Prices are driven by resource costs, supply-side structural inadequacies, or both.  
Structural inadequacies in the NEM, including falling reserve margins and market 
power events, have only ever been transient and supply-side responses have been 
marked - $52.6 billion to be precise.  We found no evidence of persistent economic 
rent and NEM average spot prices from 2016-2020 of $76/MWh equal average entry 
costs ($76/MWh per Fig.7).  Over the NEMs history (1998-2020) average spot prices 
($56/MWh) compare favourably to average NEM entry costs of $64/MWh as Fig.7 
aptly illustrated25. Only by lowering resource costs (fuel, capex, maintenance) can 
electricity prices fall further. 
 
On Resource Adequacy and investment in new capacity, if anything we found 
irrational exuberance and an excess entry result fuelled by gold rush conditions 
(Fig.20) rather than underperformance.  The NEMs organised spot and forward 
 
25 We should also point out that contract premiums and earnings from FCAS close a majority of this gap (Caps trade 
at ~30% premium, peak swaps at ~15%, base swaps at ~2% and FCAS amounts to ~$0.75/MWh). 
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markets and high Market Price Cap ($14,700, amongst the highest in the world) have 
consistently guided corrections (i.e. favourably) to structural imbalances – Fig.4 
provided the practical evidence and illustrated the patterns of entry (28,000MW) and 
exit (5000MW), while Figure 8 showed the mean-reverting pattern of spot and 
forward electricity prices.  
 
The 2017-2020 asset allocation was heavily dominated by VRE.  Of the 12,148MW 
of new capacity, just 810MW was dispatchable (Fig.2, Tab.6).  VRE-adjusted 
Reserve Margins have decreased as coal plants exited but will begin to rise again as 
the full fleet of investment commitments progresses through construction and enters 
into service.  Forward $300 cap prices have also declined (Fig.3) and consequently it 
is not entirely obvious that the NEM is underweight dispatchable capacity (although 
granted, against a new and surprisingly conservative 0.0006% Reliability Standard, 
some out-of-market Reserves will become necessary in some regions). 
 
But any under-representation of investment in dispatchable capacity is a policy 
choice, not a market design issue per se.  In 2017, the ACCC made clear its view on 
incumbent expansion with scant regard to the economics of peaking plant and its 
relationship to industrial organisation, viz. ex ante investment commitment and ex 
post performance.  The Commonwealth Government responded through its 
generation Underwriting Scheme.  Both the view26, and the policy, are misguided.  
Dispatchable capacity is best matched with stochastic retail load (see Simshauser, 
2020b), stochastic merchant generation or holders of the relevant PPA output 
(Simshauser, 2020a). Entities with stochastic assets and investment grade balance 
sheets to match are the large vertical incumbents and have been responsible for 
most (~75%) of the NEMs gas plant investments.  If large incumbents with all the 
incentives to invest in firming capacity are constrained by a regulator or deterred by 
policy, is it really surprising dispatchable capacity is underweight?   
 
Conversely, large vertical incumbents invested minimally in VRE – just 15% of the 
12,000MW committed.  What the market needs is ‘clear air’ – cancelling the 
Underwriting Scheme, and the Vic CfD scheme for that matter.  VIC VRE targets are 
entirely appropriate and States would be wise to proceed with their own 
decarbonisation policies and regimes in the absence of a unified Commonwealth 
position.  But the CfDs path is inconsistent with the NEM design.  With CfDs, no NEM 
entity takes ownership of the stochastic VRE output (unlike bilateral PPAs), and 
therefore no market entity is motivated to ‘firm’ the output by investing in dispatchable 
plant (see Simshauser, 2019c).  
 
Rising levels of zero marginal cost VRE plant is not a policy problem either – after all, 
zero marginal cost VRE are merely replacing one of the world’s lowest marginal 
running cost coal fleets, and that ultra-low cost coal fleet did not deter (28,000MW 
and $52.6b of) entry.  Ultimately the aggregate supply curve continues to be upward 
sloping.  The SA region is well beyond 50% VRE and exhibited all the conditions 
necessary for investment as the 2017-2020 cycle demonstrated.  All market 
forecasting agencies that we are aware of (e.g. Aurora, EY-Roam, Jacobs, Acil Allen, 
Frontier Economics) and academic studies (e.g. Simshauser, 2018b; Marshman et 
al., 2020) show an energy-only market remains tractable with rising VRE given a 
Market Price Cap of $14,700 and Reliability Standard of 0.002%.  In a remarkably 
detailed modelling effort which included FCAS markets, Marshman et al (2020) show 
some out-of-market peaking capacity may become necessary when aggregate VRE 




26 We should note our commentary here in no way relates to the ACCC’s assessment and identification of problems 
associated of horizontal scale, but rather, its views on vertical practices.  See Simshauser (2020b). 
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Market performance has been presented throughout this article in the context of an 
enormous number of simultaneous project commitments – 105 as Fig.10 illustrated.  
While forward project numbers may well remain elevated (cf. historic trends 
associated with the construction of very large, centralised base load generation 
investments) we should not anticipate sustained megacycle-levels of activity.  
Investment trend data in Fig.2 and Fig.10 confirms this to be the case as the 20% 
Renewable Portfolio Standard ‘2020 window’ closed. This tends to suggest 
connection lags (Tab.4) and MLF shocks (Fig.15) will also recede and therefore do 
not warrant policy attention. 
 
• Connection times will presumably shrink as firms become more familiar with 
the s5.3.4B process, and PSCAD Models of Networks become more refined.   
 
• MLF shocks, while unfortunate for the ~2645MW of affected projects, can be 
minimised in future through greater transparency of the status of 
(anonymised) rival projects by location27, and provision of location loss factor 
sensitivities on a fee-for-service basis – clearly, the Market Operator has 
every incentive to do so without explicit policy intervention.   
 
In the course of this research, we formed a view that power system security (Fig.11-
12), power system strength (Fig.13) and FCAS market service coverage (Fig.14) are 
the central market problems.  We consider their resolution to be of utmost urgency.  
As this became clear to us, we submitted two Rule Change proposals to the AEMC 
with a view to introducing new FCAS markets for i). Fast Frequency Response and 
ii). Operating Reserves.  The Market Operator also submitted a Rule Change 
proposal vis-à-vis Primary Frequency Response.28  We expect these will provide the 
Market Operator with new weapons to restore some, but not all, elements of the 
NEM’s faltering resilience.  
 
This leaves system strength.  Although organised spot markets are our inherent bias, 
they are costly to administer.  We are of the view that some level of pre-emptive 
investment in system strength services should be Administratively Determined to 
cope with inevitable forecasting errors and newly identified modes of failure with the 
default or benchmark solution being synchronous condensers.  
 
VRE production curtailment is not a problem but a symptom of market economics 
(i.e. negative prices or investment congestion), security-constrained dispatch, or 
both.  The former warrants not a second of policymaker time or attention, and the 
latter should be an outcome of Administrative Decisions relating to system strength.  
The tyranny of distance with system strength solutions means some remote 
generators may never avoid curtailment, and that is likely to be efficient. 
 
Long run market re-design proposals for the NEM, including a shift from zonal to 
nodal pricing and from real-time to day-ahead markets, remain intriguing but are a 
distraction.  They are also widely considered amongst investors and utilities to be the 
best way to halt generation investment ‘dead in its tracks’.  The reason for this is 
axiomatic – a major redesign of the market creates a transition period where any 
contract must straddle two completely different market environments – bounded 
rationality, ambiguity and uncertainty must ultimately lead to a merchant investment 
freeze.  Ironically, such conditions are probably worse than ongoing random 
interventions.   
 
27 Indeed, Rule changes were proposed by multiple parties (and consolidated) to address this issue.  See 
https://www.aemc.gov.au/rule-changes/nem-information-project-developers  
28 Unfortunately, Primary Frequency Response was implemented as a ‘mandatory requirement’ without reserved 
headroom thereby mis-pricing a valuable service and in consequence, failing to address the underlying problem of 
declining system security resources. We are not aware of any work undertaken to identify the efficient level of the 
service required. 
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To be sure, we see merit in an ahead market for system security services where the 
Market Operator otherwise faces constraints with intervention times. Operating 
Reserves also necessarily involve reserving capacity ahead of some future 
(uncertain) need. However, we see no economic justification for shifting the spot 
electricity market to a day-ahead platform.  As for nodal pricing, its superior 
performance relative to a zonal model is unquestionable but dispatch inefficiencies of 
just $3-15 million per annum29 have been identified through disorderly bidding and 
pale into insignificance to NEM market turnover of $19,500 million per annum.  
Disorderly bidding has virtually no effect on end-consumer pricing, and a shift to 
dramatically more nodes risks Balkanising the NEMs liquid zonal hedge markets – 
the quintessential market that guides investment, facilitates retail competition and 
‘grounds’ consumer pricing.  As a long skinny network with a history of market power 
events, it is not entirely obvious that nodal will outperform zonal due to the 
transaction costs of the change, especially if the hedge market is damaged. 
 
And for those querying locational investment signals, Pension Funds (59%) and 
Developers (36%) whose site selection was a mistake in retrospect (Tab.5) have 
been allocated with a commensurate MLF as a perennial reminder of their decision.  
The lesson is laid before all to see, and learn from. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Most global electricity market designs have been reasonably successful to date at 
delivering reliable supply, including Australia’s energy-only gross pool.  The NEM 
design and its associated forward markets have evidently achieved what it was 
designed to do – the Reliability Standard has been met with few exceptions (Fig.5), 
prices reflect underlying resource costs (Fig.7), and capacity investment has 
consistently flowed when required (Fig.4 & Fig.7).  Further, the NEM’s Emergency 
Trader provisions functioned when coal plant closure rates accelerated (noting exit 
notification periods were a form of market failure in their own right and the subject of 
subsequent policy change). 
 
Globally, no loosely interconnected electricity market has been forced to deal with the 
VRE market shares observed in South Australia, or the relative Rate of Change 
experienced by the NEM.  We consider FCAS markets for Fast Frequency 
Response, Operating Reserves, and System Strength to be of utmost urgency.  
These services were a joint product of coal plant output and were therefore 
previously unpriced, but their shortfall following the changeover from synchronous to 
asynchronous plant has since led to daily Market Operator interventions. 
 
In our view, these missing markets need to be procured on a probabilistic basis 
because n-1 contingencies are gradually being surpassed by new modes of failure, 
some visible and other yet to be revealed.  Synchronous Condensers, the default 
solution to system strength, or alternative emerging technologies need to be 
originated on a proactive basis to locations where grid stability may be at risk under 
conditions of rapid plant closure or entry.  By being one step ahead, future system 
security disruptions could be minimised. In our view, the risks are asymmetric and 
the cost of over-investment is less than the cost of under-investment. 
 
None of our analysis pointed to an alternate market design that might have improved 
outcomes.  Nodal pricing, capacity markets, and day-ahead markets are of course 
well proven in various jurisdictions30.  So too is driving on the right-hand side of the 
road.  For better or worse, Australia has a left-hand road network and a zonal, real-
time energy-only electricity market design.  Changing to a right-hand road network 
would allow Australian consumers to access a vastly greater pool of vehicles. But 
 
29 See AEMC (2013) ‘Transmission Frameworks Review Final Report’ at Section 8.4.2. 
30 Although few markets have been exposed to NEM exit conditions (especially 2016-2017) and a Rate of Change 
experienced by the NEM in 2017-2020. 
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changing Australia’s road network mid-stream would involve breathtaking transaction 
costs.  In the case of Australia’s NEM, changing design mid-stream will impact 
$52.6b of generation commitments, freeze merchant generation plant investment, 
frustrate each and every retail and wholesale contract spanning the event, and, will 
almost certainly induce liquidity events in an already complex refinancing task 
(Fig.17). 
 
Indeed, critical to the functionality of the power system as a whole is maintaining the 
confidence of both debt and equity capital markets if requisite future investment in 
generation and network plant is to occur. Capricious and random interventions by 
government to support particular generation projects heightens perceptions of 
sovereign risk, not to mention a long history of producing higher overall systems 
costs and welfare losses. As perceptions of sovereign risk heighten, investment 
discontinuity is predictable.   
 
Glossary  
ABS     Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ACCC    Australian Competition & Consumer Commission 
AEC     Australian Energy Council (successor to ESAA) 
AEMC    Australian Energy Market Commission (NEM Policymaking body) 
AEMO    Australian Energy Market Operator (NEM Market Operator) 
AER     Australian Energy Regulator 
ARENA   Australian Renewable Energy Agency 
AUD     Australian Dollar 
BNEF    Bloomberg New Energy Finance  
CCGT    Combined Cycle Gas Turbine 
CfD     Contract-for-Difference 
ESG     Environmental, Social and Governance 
ESAA    Energy Supply Association of Australia 
FCAS    Frequency Control Ancillary Services 
Hz      Hertz (50Hz in Australia) 
MLF     Marginal Loss Factor (network loss ascribed to each connection point) 
MW     Mega Watt 
MWh     Megawatt hour 
NEM     National Electricity Market 
NSW     New South Wales (NEM Region) 
OCGT    Open Cycle Gas Turbine 
OEM     Original Equipment Manufacturer 
QLD     Queensland (NEM Region) 
PPA     Power Purchase Agreement 
SA      South Australia (NEM Region) 
Solar PV   Solar Photovoltaic 
TAS     Tasmania (NEM Region) 
TWh     Terrawatt hour 
VIC     Victoria (NEM Region) 
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APPENDIX I – Figure A1 Changes to Australia’s Renewable Portfolio Standard 
 
 
APPENDIX II – PF Model Overview 
 
In the PF Model, costs increase annually by a forecast general inflation rate (CPI).  
Prices escalate at a discount to CPI.  Inflation rates for revenue streams 𝜋𝑗
𝑅 and cost 
streams 𝜋𝑗
𝐶 in period (year) j are calculated as follows: 
 
𝜋𝑗





 , and 𝜋𝑗





    (1)      
 
The discounted value for 𝛼𝑅 reflects single factor learning rates that characterise 
generating technologies.   
 
Energy output 𝑞𝑗
𝑖  from each plant (i) in each period (j) is a key variable in driving 
revenue streams, unit fuel costs and variable Operations & Maintenance costs.  
Energy output is calculated by reference to installed capacity 𝑘𝑖, capacity utilisation 
rate 𝐶𝐹𝑗
𝑖 for each period j.  Plant auxillary losses 𝐴𝑢𝑥𝑖 arising from on-site electrical 




𝑖. 𝑘𝑖. (1 − 𝐴𝑢𝑥𝑖)        (2) 
 
A convergent electricity price for the ith plant (𝑝𝑖𝜀) is calculated in year one and 





𝑖 . 𝑝𝑖𝜀 . 𝜋𝑗
𝑅)         (3) 
 
In order to define marginal running costs, the thermal efficiency for each generation 
technology 𝑖 needs to be defined.  The constant term ‘3600’31 is divided by 𝑖 to 
convert the efficiency result from % to kJ/kWh.  This is then multiplied by raw fuel 
commodity cost 𝑓𝑖.  Variable Operations & Maintenance costs 𝑣𝑖, where relevant, are 
added which produces a pre-carbon short run marginal cost.  Under conditions of 
externality pricing 𝐶𝑃𝑗, the CO2 intensity of output needs to be defined.  Plant carbon 
intensity 𝑔𝑖 is derived by multiplying the plant heat rate by combustion emissions ?̇?𝑖 
and fugitive CO2 emissions 𝑔𝑖.  Marginal running costs in the jth period is then 
 

















Statutory Reviews of the 
Renewable Portfolio Standard
Rooftop PV flooded market, 
before being separated out
Revised target after 2014
Expanded target pre-2014 review
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calculated by the product of short run marginal production costs by generation output 
𝑞𝑗









. 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖) + (𝑔𝑖. 𝐶𝑃𝑗)] . 𝑞𝑗
𝑖 . 𝜋𝑗





}  (4) 
 
Fixed Operations & Maintenance costs 𝐹𝑂𝑀𝑗
𝑖 of the plant are measured in 
$/MW/year of installed capacity 𝐹𝐶𝑖 and are multiplied by plant capacity 𝑘𝑖 and 
escalated.   
 
𝐹𝑂𝑀𝑗
𝑖 = 𝐹𝐶𝑖 . 𝑘𝑖. 𝜋𝑗
𝐶         (5)    
Earnings Before Interest Tax Depreciation and Amortisation (EBITDA) in the jth 






𝑖)        (6) 
    
Capital Costs (𝑋0
𝑖) for each plant i are Overnight Capital Costs and incurred in year 0.  
Ongoing capital spending (𝑥𝑗
𝑖) for each period j is determined as the inflated annual 





𝐶          (7) 
 
Plant capital costs 𝑋0
𝑖  give rise to tax depreciation (𝑑𝑗
𝑖) such that if the current period 
was greater than the plant life under taxation law (L), then the value is 0.  In addition, 
𝑥𝑗











)         (8) 
 
From here, taxation payable (𝜏𝑗
𝑖) at the corporate taxation rate (𝜏𝑐) is applied to 
 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑗
𝑖  less Interest on Loans (𝐼𝑗
𝑖) later defined in (16), less 𝑑𝑗
𝑖.  To the extent (𝜏𝑗
𝑖) 
results in non-positive outcome, tax losses (𝐿𝑗








𝑖 ). 𝜏𝑐)      (9) 
 
𝐿𝑗




𝑖 ). 𝜏𝑐)      (10) 
 
The debt financing model computes interest and principal repayments on different 
debt facilities depending on the type, structure and tenor of tranches.  There are two 
types of debt facilities – (a) corporate facilities (i.e. balance-sheet financings) and (2) 
project financings.  Debt structures include semi-permanent amortising facilities and 
bullet facilities.   
 
Corporate Finance typically involves 5- and 7-year bond issues with an implied ‘BBB’ 
credit rating.  Project Finance include a 5-7 year bullet facility requiring interest-only 
payments after which it is refinanced with consecutive amortising facilities and fully 
amortised over an 18-25 year period (depending on the technology).  The second 
facility commences with a tenor of 7-12 years as an amortising facility set within a 
semi-permanent structure with a nominal repayment term of 18-25 years.  The 
decision tree for the two tranches of debt was the same, so for the Debt Tranche 
where 𝐷𝑇 = 1 or 2, the calculation is as follows: 
 








𝑖 . 𝑆                  
       (11) 
 
𝐷0
𝑖  refers to the total amount of debt used in the project.  The split (S) of the debt 
between each facility refers to the manner in which debt is apportioned to each 
tranche.  In the model, 35% of debt is assigned to Tranche 1 and the remainder to 
Tranche 2.  Principal 𝑃𝑗−1
𝑖  refers to the amount of principal repayment for tranche T in 
















)       (12) 
 
In (12), 𝑅𝑇𝑗 is the relevant interest rate swap (5yr, 7yr or 12yr) and 𝐶𝑇𝑗 is the credit 
spread or margin relevant to the issued Debt Tranche.  The relevant interest payment 
in the jth period (𝐼𝑗
𝑖) is calculated as the product of the (fixed) interest rate on the loan 






𝑧 )         (13) 
 
Total Debt outstanding 𝐷𝑗
𝑖, total Interest 𝐼𝑗
𝑖  and total Principle 𝑃𝑗
𝑖 for the ith plant is 
calculated as the sum of the above components for the two debt tranches in time j.  
For clarity, Loan Drawings are equal to 𝐷0
𝑖  in year 1 as part of the initial financing and 
are otherwise 0.   
 
One of the key calculations is the initial derivation of 𝐷0
𝑖  (as per eq.11).  This is 
determined by the product of the gearing level and the Overnight Capital Cost (𝑋0
𝑖).  
Gearing levels are formed by applying a cash flow constraint based on credit metrics 
applied by project banks and capital markets.  The variable 𝛾 in our PF Model relates 
specifically to the legal structure of the business and the credible capital structure 
achievable.  The two relevant legal structures are Vertically Integrated (VI) merchant 
utilities (issuing ‘BBB’ rated bonds) and Independent Power Producers using Project 






































𝑖   
 (14)  
   
Credit metrics32 (𝛿𝑗
𝑉𝐼) and (𝜔𝑗
𝑉𝐼) are exogenously determined by credit rating 
agencies and are outlined in Table 3.  Values for 𝛿𝑗
𝑃𝐹 are exogenously determined by 
project banks and depend on technology (i.e. thermal vs. renewable) and the extent 
of energy market exposure, that is whether a Power Purchase Agreement exists or 
not.  For clarity, 𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑗
𝑖 is ‘Funds From Operations’ while 𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑗
𝑖 and 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝑅𝑗
𝑖 are the 











𝑖] . (1 + 𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗)𝑁
𝑗=1 − ∑ 𝑥𝑗
𝑖 . (1 + 𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗)𝑁
𝑗=1        (15) 
 
At this point, all of the necessary conditions exist to produce estimates of the long run 
marginal cost of power generation technologies along with relevant equations to 
solve for the price (𝑝𝑖𝜀) given expected equity returns (𝐾𝑒) whilst simultaneously 
 
32 For Balance Sheet Financings, Funds From Operations over Interest, and Net Debt to EBITDA respectively. For 
Project Financings, Debt Service Cover Ratio and Loan Life Cover Ratio.  
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meeting the constraints of 𝛿𝑗
𝑉𝐼 and 𝜔𝑗
𝑉𝐼 or 𝛿𝑗
𝑃𝐹given the relevant business 
combinations.  The primary objective is to expand every term which contains 𝑝𝑖𝜀.  
Expansion of the EBITDA and Tax terms is as follows: 
 
0 = −𝑋0














𝑖 ) . 𝜏𝑐] . (1 + 𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗) − ∑ 𝑥𝑗
𝑖 . (1 + 𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗) − 𝐷0
𝑖𝑁
𝑗=1          (16) 
 
The terms are then rearranged such that only the 𝑝𝑖𝜀 term is on the left-hand side of 
the equation: 
 
Let 𝐼𝑅𝑅 ≡  𝐾𝑒   
 
∑ (1 − 𝜏𝑐).𝑝𝑖 . 𝑞𝑗
𝑖 . 𝜋𝑗
𝑅. (1 + 𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗)𝑁
𝑗=1 = 𝑋0
𝑖 − ∑ [−(1 − 𝜏𝑐). 𝜗𝑗
𝑖 − (1 − 𝜏𝑐). 𝐹𝑂𝑀𝑗







𝑖 ). (1 + 𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗)] + ∑ 𝑥𝑗
𝑖 . (1 + 𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗) +𝐷0
𝑖𝑁
𝑗=1       (17) 
 
The model then solves for 𝑝𝑖𝜀 such that: 
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